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1. Introduction
The belief that sovereignty is at the eleventh hour has become more widespread with the progress of the globalization 
phenomenon. The notion that sovereignty is somehow being transformed by the process of economic globalization and that 
this is being exacerbated by the Internet—one of the cutting-edge tools of globalization—has become an almost uncritically 
accepted fact. Large swathes of public opinion in industrialized democracies have been mesmerized by the pervasive 
equation that more globalization (and more Internet) equals less sovereignty. In this article we attempt to dissect the 
proposition that more Internet equals a further decrease in state sovereignty. We argue that, while state sovereignty is 
unmistakably declining, the Internet is, in the best case, one more element contributing to that decline. Indeed, in some 
instances the Internet can even strengthen sovereignty.
In this article we address the question of whether and how the Internet is affecting/changing states’ sovereignty. Our article 
for this special issue of Information and Security is best conceived as a “plausibility probe.” 1 The purpose of such a study is 
to enable the investigator to judge whether the potential validity of the explanatory hypothesis (or hypotheses) is large 
enough to justify a greater effort to produce more decisive hypotheses-testing studies.2 The fact that the Internet is still 
somewhat of an unknown topic in many disciplines (including security studies) ensures that any exploratory investigation 
must proceed with inductive logic. This will allow us to enhance our conceptual tools with the ultimate goal of producing 
more systematic hypotheses in further studies.
Sovereignty (from the Latin word super, above) basically means authority. The notion was first developed by Jean Bodin 
(1530 -1596) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who identified it with the authority emanating from the sovereign. More 
recently, sovereignty has been defined as “... the claim to be the ultimate authority, subject to no higher power as regards the 
making and enforcing of political decisions. In the international system, sovereignty is the claim by the state to full self-
government….”3 Sovereignty has simultaneously an internal and an external significance, since the concept implies 
autonomy in foreign policy and exclusive competence in internal affairs.4 The former attribute is thus indispensable to be a 
member of the international society of states; while the latter means that that authority is limited/circumscribed by borders 
(beyond which lays the sovereignty of others) and can be exercised only over the population residing within those 
boundaries. Scholars have traced the origins of the concept to the Treaties of Westphalia (M•nster and Osnabr•ck) which, in 
1648, concluded the Thirty Years War (the title of this article is an explicit reference to the religious diversity also 
established by the treaties). The treaties established “… a secular concept of international relations replacing forever the 
medieval idea of a universal religious authority acting as the final arbiter of Christendom.” 5 Consequently, from 1648 
onwards, the particularistic interests of states became paramount both politically and legally. Given the unconditional 
authority that characterized the Westphalian conception of the nation-state and sovereignty, it is not surprising that an 
erosion of sovereignty has been steadily accruing over the centuries. In the end, the diffusion of the Internet is seen by 
futurologists and many technologists as a “lethal” instrument for states’ authority.
2. Towards a Conceptual Framework
The contemporary debates concerning the Internet and sovereignty are characterized by what appears to be an uncanny 
paradox. While the new Internet technologies favor speed and decentralization, one of the most salient features of the 
political systems, in which they operate, is that they are simply not set up in this way. Politics tends to be a slow and 
consensus seeking business, it is usually characterized by uncertainty and an incredible sensitivity to particular interests. 
How these conflicts are resolved will have a major impact on the development trajectory of the Internet. These two 
conflicting dynamics are encapsulated by two radically different perspectives on the Internet.
On the one hand, the engineer/technologist perspective, views the Internet as an astonishingly elegant and seamless global 
information network that transcends national borders. It is because of this transnational technological attribute that the 
ability of nation states to regulate or control the Internet is severely curtailed, this logically entails an erosion of sovereignty. 
On the other hand, a regulator perspective, offers a stark contrast. Seen from this perspective, the cyberworld is presently in 
an anarchic state of nature. Major regulatory fault lines are emerging in relation to areas such taxation, applicable law, 
copyright and content, to name but a few. Political solutions to this regulatory “chaos” will have to be negotiated and to the 
extent that nation-states are able to create adequate regulatory regimes this does not necessarily entail an erosion of 
sovereignty.
There is of course an obvious danger in polarizing what is an infinitely more complex picture. The research design and 
conceptualization adopted in this article is intended to principally serve as a heuristic device, it can subsequently form the 
basis for a more rigorous and systematic formulation of hypotheses. It is an attempt to provide a “photo-type” picture of the 
current state of affairs concerning the interaction between emerging digital technologies and our institutions of governance. 
What are the regulatory outcomes that are being produced by this interaction as policymakers respond to the challenges 
posed by the Internet? Has the technological juggernaut constrained policy-makers options? If this is so then one can 
justifiably refer to an erosion of sovereignty. Or is the nation-state adapting to this new environment and, if so, with what 
results?
One way in which this adaptation process works is through the mediation of disparate interests within the arenas of political 
interaction. The proliferation in the use of the Internet has mobilized a whole host of actors into strategic political action. 
These actors, ranging from business organizations and civil liberties groups to policy-makers and law enforcers, interact in 
different political arenas to achieve their desired goals. The outcome of these interactions usually takes the form of new 
rules. As new rules are created by assigning property rights, by constraining actors choices and by prescribing who can act 
and when, a regulatory regime begins to emerge and will affect behavior both directly and indirectly. The creation of these 
rules, which vary across various dimensions of formality and specificity, are central to any discussion of governance and 
sovereignty. Is it conceivable that as new regulatory regimes emerge, both at the international and supranational levels, 
states can actually enhance, or at least not suffer a serious diminution of sovereignty? In setting up the problem we are 
interested in examining the role of the political arena, be it national or international, in shaping regulatory outcomes.
3. Hypotheses and Variables
We can now proceed to translate these ideas into a simple causal argument using the language of variables. These can 
subsequently form the basis for a set of rival hypothesis that posit distinct outcomes. Our dependent variable is changes in 
sovereignty, and we wish to explain the extent to which the new Internet technologies are producing erosion in states’ 
sovereignty. Internet technologies are, therefore, our independent variable. We however add another variable to the analysis, 
which we have referred to as the political arena of interaction. This acts as an intervening variable, and it has a mediating 
affect between the independent and the dependent variable. Does this intervening variable have a significant effect on 
regulatory outcomes? Can it be ignored or treated as a residual?
The aim of this—admittedly very simplistic set up—is to attempt to test for the role of the political arena. The simplicity of 
this set up however is justified by the purpose of this article, which is to be an “exploratory” study on this still rather 
indefinite and debated topic of Internet and state sovereignty. Having identified the key variables we can now postulate two 
rival hypotheses that differ with regard to the outcomes (see the diagram).
1) The “techno-driven” or “general belief” hypothesis: the more the Internet grows, the more sovereignty is eroded. 
Futurologists and large portion of the informed public (the so-called “digerati”) share this view. They maintain that 
technology has a strong direct influence on policymakers’ ability to pursue independent policy. Most techno-driven 
hypotheses share a similar diagnosis of the futility of attempting to steer technical change. Nicholas Negroponte, 6 one of the 
Information Age gurus, offers a “rosy” version of the techno-driven thesis. As we move away from the “atom” society to the 
‘bit’ (i.e. digital) society the structure of society, the economy and current forms of political organization will be 
transformed.
One of the chief victims will be the nation-state, which will be unable to withstand the decentralizing, globalizing, and 
empowering potential of digital technologies. Others, such as Angell, 7 while agreeing with Negroponte as to the irrelevance 
of political institutions offer a much darker prognosis in which mass unemployment and anarchy will prevail. The defining 
characteristic of these techno-driven approaches is that they all share a similar conception of the main agent of change and 
the powerlessness of institutions in the face of technological imperatives. They all point to an erosion of sovereignty.
2) The “politics matters” hypothesis: Internet growth does not inevitably translate into decrease in state sovereignty. It can 
even lead to an increase. It thus becomes paramount to analyze the “politics” of the Internet growth. This “institutionalist” 
view does not necessarily treat the technological change as unimportant; rather the influence of that change will be heavily 
filtered by domestic political and institutional structures.
Policy responses will reflect certain cultural values. There may be a greater likelihood of international conflict in the 
political economy of the Internet arising, for instance, as a result of differing views as to the role of governments. It may 
also arise from the way in which interests are articulated within different political systems. Such analyses put the 
institutional and political framework at the core of the analysis.8
4. Cases
To support our argument, hereafter we present four examples of decrease (-) or no-change/increase ( ) in sovereignty. One 
example of a decrease, online tax (-) and one example of a no-change/increase ( ), Yahoo!. Furthermore, in order to 
maximize variation on our dependent variable we provide two additional examples, Domain Names and the management of 
the Internet and cybercrime. These contain elements that can be viewed both as a decrease and an increase in sovereignty. 
We have selected the cases on the basis of variations of our dependent variable (changes in sovereignty), which is a well-
known procedure in social science methodology.9
4.1 Domain Names and the Management of the Internet
Since its origins, the Domain Name System (DNS) has determined on-line identities. Clearly, the DNS is vital for the private 
sector, where brands and trademarks are the key to business success. Companies want their names to be recognized 
worldwide—including the World Wide Web—and do not want unknown individuals to illegally exploit or meddle with their 
reputation. On the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding signed with the US Department of Commerce in October 1998 
a new organization was born—the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)—a non-profit, private 
sector corporation formed by a broad coalition of the Internet’s business, technical, academic, and user communities.
ICANN, along with other similar governance organizations such as the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) have since become the closest thing that there is to an “Internet government.” 10 It 
appears that governments have surrendered considerable authority to these new organizations, which can powerfully 
influence Internet development. This in turn can lead to further erosion of state sovereignty. In the case of the W3C, for 
instance, governments can have the status of “members” just like a corporation or an NGO, with no special privileges 
attached. This process of “U.N.ization” of the Internet seems to confirm the futurologists’ explanation and the general belief 
that the spreading of the Internet inevitably implies a reduction of states’ authority.
This interpretation is only partially correct. In fact, states do “fight back” the loss of sovereignty. EU governments, for 
instance, have only reluctantly embraced the “privatization” process of the DNS, adopted (to some extents, imposed) by the 
United States, where the public tends to see the reduction of the federal state’s involvement as a positive development. In 
fact, EU member states have tried to reverse the process, limiting ICANN’s unaccountability and independence. The near-
adoption of a .eu extension for Europe, excluded from ICANN interference is an indication of such attitude.
Other states—including less democratic ones—have adopted the same attitude. China, for instance, has undertaken a “tug-of-
war with Western domain-name monitoring and registration firms over who has control of Chinese-language Internet 
naming rights.” 11The China Internet Network Information Center (a government agency) on 18 January 2000 initiated 
Chinese domain-name testing system with suffixes of Chinese-language counterparts of .cn, .com, and .net. Western 
registration organizations have claimed that such decision can pose a threat to the uniformity of Internet addresses. The 
Chinese government is thus trying to prevent Western influences and business advantage while, at the same time, preserve 
its freedom of action with censorship. Ultimately, “... the issue has risen alarmingly to the level of a dispute over national 
sovereignty rather than simple registration activity and concerns over commercial interests.” 12
4.2 Yahoo!
A recent example of a nation state asserting itself concerns the French Yahoo! Court case. It is likely to have important 
repercussions and has led to an important debate with regard to the governance of the Internet. In April 2000, three anti-
racist and Jewish associations (Licra, Mrap and UEJF) lodged a complaint against Yahoo! before a French Court for hosting 
online auctions of Nazi memorabilia. French law prohibits the exhibition of objects that incite racial hatred. The Court case 
could be interpreted as something of a test case to see who has the power, and confidence in their legal system, to attempt to 
regulate aspects of the Internet.13
The issue arose in the context of a growing anti-globalization backlash and, in France, was allied with a general perception 
of the invasion of American culture. Conversely, on the other side of the Atlantic it was seen as yet another manifestation of 
French intransigence. In France, it was portrayed as a case of whether a nation-state can regulate within its jurisdiction, i.e. 
prohibit unlawful content, or whether it has to be subject to a set of lowest common denominator laws, i.e. the freedom of 
speech laws of the US that permit such activity. The French courts decided to hold Yahoo! responsible and gave it three 
months to block access to the US auction site. A raging debate ensued amongst interested parties as to the merits/flaws of 
the decision. Yahoo! initially argued that it was impossible to filter every piece of information. Nevertheless, in January 
2001 as the profit implications and bad publicity for the company in a lucrative market sank in, it agreed to block the sale of 
Nazi memorabilia on its auction sites, in effect capitulating to the extraterritoriality of the French Court. The self-censorship 
marked a significant U-turn by the US portal, which had previously opposed the principle that it should block access.14
In a rather prophetic article that was written before the Yahoo!-case, Goldsmith 15 had set out the reasons why unilateral 
actions were likely to be a much more frequent attribute of the governance of the Internet and the conditions in which it 
would be successful. He argued that governments can take significant actions to regulate the flow of items within its 
borders, i.e. by imposing cost on persons and properties within its territories. This could take the form of punishing local 
assets of foreign content providers or penalizing in-state end-users who obtain foreign content. Although governments will 
not be able to eliminate all individual transactions they can significantly raise the cost of the activity in question to achieve 
their desired goals. This is precisely what occurred in the Yahoo!-case. Such events are beginning to explode the myth of the 
borderless nature of Internet as well overturning some of the more utopian Internet pioneer’s “information libertarianism” 
whose unifying ideal was a desire for unfettered information flows and opposition to any forms of censorship.
4.3 Taxation on the Internet
“No taxation without representation” was a motto of the American Revolution, which implied that the imposition of taxes 
without proper laws passed in a parliament representing the local constituency was a despised manifestation of absolute 
monarchs. Indeed, since the origins of the modern state, imposing taxes has been one of the most distinctive features of 
sovereignty. Although, thus far, electronic commerce is still only a fraction of global trade, governments fear that that 
prerogative of state power could be severely limited by the fast growth of electronic commerce and began to consider ways 
in which to tackle such a prospect.
Tax imposition can only work within the precise limits of a state’s boundaries. The Internet, among other roles, is also an 
“international trade route,” 16 thus requiring special treatment in terms of taxation (as well as law enforcement, etc.). Quite 
unsurprisingly, “... the United States Treasury Department has identified the tax ramifications of such high-technology 
issues as transactions over the Internet as a ‘top-priority’ international issue ....” 17 Last but not least, to make their action 
even more problematic, states still use mid-twentieth century tax systems—designed largely for manufacturers and vendors 
of tangible personal property—to tax a technologically advanced 21st century service industry. 18
National governments are by no means powerless: they can still track resident individuals and physical goods and tax them. 
However, several products are already available in digital format (from music to books to films), and this tendency will only 
increase in the future. It is difficult if not plain impossible (especially if they are all encrypted) to monitor the traffic of these 
products. The situation is even more manifest with services (including moving money tax avoidance and other criminal 
shifting of income), which hardly leave traces. Finally, the extreme variety and span of national tax systems makes it 
extremely problematic to yield international treaties that would satisfy all parties. 19 Nowhere is this more the case than with 
the current Internet tax state of affairs.
On the one hand, the US wants to maintain the current Internet tax moratorium, while on the other hand the European 
Commission is keen to apply VAT to Internet transactions. These differences will need to be ironed out and will be subject 
to intense negotiations. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the Internet “... presents a serious informational and enforcement 
crisis to revenue authorities.” 20 If governments cannot find a proper mode to answer this challenge, the erosion of the tax 
basis in the long run could fatally undermine the very existence of state sovereignty.
4.4 Cybercrime
The cybercrime example is illustrative of the interaction between technologies and issues of sovereignty. On one hand, 
cyber criminals have the potential to operate globally, while on the other hand, prosecuting agencies are bound by the 
principle of national sovereignty and are limited by national territory, which can only be overcome by slow and bureaucratic 
means of mutual assistance. Thus, in relation to cybercrime this contradiction makes international and supranational 
solutions indispensable since the non-coordination of national strategies could result in the proliferation of cybercrime 
havens. At the heart of the policy is the challenge to ensure basic rights, i.e. privacy and anonymity, while permitting 
restrictions to these rights in certain circumstances. How is this balancing act being negotiated?
To date some of the measures adopted to combat the potential for cybercrime by some countries have inflamed civil liberty 
groups both in the US and in the EU. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 21 in the UK and the FBI’s development 
of the Carnivore program 22 in the US are clear examples of the privacy concerns raised by legislation and the advances in 
technology that enhance the surveillance powers of nation-states. Is it possible that by coming together, through multilateral 
frameworks, nation states can actually enhance aspects of their sovereignty?
The international arena, however, poses problems with regard to issues such as sovereignty and cultural diversity as well as 
very different traditions of criminal law. To date there has been a degree of international activity on the issue of cybercrime, 
of which the most significant examples include the G8 Recommendations 23 and the OECD guidelines.24
By far the most important multilateral coordination is taking place at the Council of Europe (CoE), which in 1997 began 
negotiations to draft a treaty on cybercrime. The drafting process was conducted in a closed and secret environment with the 
first public draft only released in April 2000.25 The CoE Draft Convention on Cyber Crime will be a defining text given that 
it will constitute the first international treaty on cybercrime. It is based on the premise that the risks related to cybercrime 
need to be addressed at the international level and, to this end, aims to create a world benchmark or minimum standard in the 
fight against cybercrime. Indeed, many non-European countries such as the US, Canada, Japan and South Africa actively 
participate in the drafting process. Most importantly, the process sets itself apart from what is occurring at other 
international forums such as the G8, OECD and the United Nations due to its binding nature. The draft, as it stands, aims to 
a) harmonize legislation on what constitutes a cybercrime, i.e. the substantive law issues; b) enhance investigative 
procedures, i.e. procedural law issues; and c) to develop closer international cooperation.
The aspect of the Treaty, which is most controversial given its enormous implications for privacy, is the section that deals 
with procedural law, i.e. interception of communications and seizure of computer data by governments. These investigative 
powers issues have inflamed civil liberties groups and business organizations. For instance, the Center for Democracy and 
Technology (CDT)—a respected Washington D.C. based civil liberties group—has condemned the unbalanced nature of the 
Treaty which includes very detailed procedures for interception and seizure mechanisms without any corresponding privacy 
standards or real limits to government powers. 26 CDT has pointed out the paradoxical nature of the draft, which is not 
“focused on viruses, hacking or other attacks against computer systems or the computer-dependent critical infrastructures. 
Instead, central provisions of the Treaty are intended to require governments to adopt laws on search and seizure of 
computer evidence, disclosure to governments of computerized records of any kind, and electronic interception of 
communications—for all kinds of crimes.” 27
In other words, the major focus of the Treaty is on enhancing the surveillance potential for law enforcement agencies 
through increased investigative powers. This has led some civil liberties groups to claim that the FBI is using a foreign 
forum to create an international law enforcement regime. 28 There is certainly some force to this argument given the role of 
the US Justice Department in the drafting process.
Law enforcement/security agencies have been mobilized into seeking preemptive action, or creating a favorable rule regime 
to enhance their surveillance and interception powers (not just for Internet crimes but also as a means of combating 
traditional crimes). The preferred arena, given the nature of the problem, is the international level. At the same time, 
however, another group of actors pursuing very different agendas have been mobilized to counteract the demands of the law 
enforcement/security agencies, which are deemed to pose either draconian privacy intrusions or disproportionate financial 
burdens.
The outcome of these battles between rival interests will be largely determined by the power relations between the 
competing organizations and the set up of the political arena in which the rules are created. Thus, the political arena can 
provide for varying degrees of access to power for the respective organizations. For instance, in the case of the CoE Draft 
Cybercrime Convention the law enforcement/security agencies—given that they had a fist mover advantage—were able to 
play a dominant role in the drafting of the Treaty text. They therefore played a crucial role in the agenda-setting process.
5. Conclusions
To review the central argument and by way of conclusion let us briefly revisit the hypotheses. We have argued that the 
simplistic proposition that more Internet equals less sovereignty seriously underestimates the ability of the nation state to 
adapt to a given technological reality. Thus, all we claim, at this early stage, is that nations do seem to be responding and 
that these responses will tend to have an influence on the development trajectory of the Internet. Whether developments in 
the technological domain will find a way to circumvent onerous policy decisions is, for the moment, a separate research 
question. The serious research agenda is to explain the conditions in which a nation state can assert itself and those where it 
is more difficult.
Our Yahoo! and cybercrime examples demonstrate that under certain conditions, i.e. where a nation state can punish an 
alleged transgressor’s asset base or where agents of the nation state such as law enforcers enjoy agenda setting powers, the 
simplistic view of the techno-driven hypothesis begins to breaks down. Conversely, the taxation and ICANN examples are 
illustrative of instances where sovereignty can be called into question. Nevertheless, even in these latter cases it seems that 
the nation state may have more room for maneuver than is commonly assumed. The increasing politicization of ICANN’s 
organizational structure and looming transatlantic differences with regard to online taxation suggest that politics still 
matters. The simplistic equation that we set out to examine should be reformulated along the following—equally simplistic 
but perhaps more accurate—lines: More Internet equals more politicization. We believe that examining the nature of this 
politicization, and the conditions in which it entails an erosion of sovereignty, constitutes a much more fruitful research 
agenda.
Defense operational requirements for communications support are derived from the development and fielding of warfighter 
information systems such as the Battlefield Command System and information services such as collaborative planning, 
information assurance (IA), and battlefield video teleconferencing (VTC). Non-Defense operational requirements are 
derived from information services such as collaborative planning, information assurance, and operational video 
teleconferencing (VTC). The throughput requirements and speed of service demanded by these operational requirements 
have made the current communications networks obsolete.
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